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ABSTRACT: Panopticism is commonly taken to rely on something like a panoptic gaze – a read-
ing of Foucault which still prevails in the discussion of today’s surveillance (and subjectification) 
technologies in the wake of Surveiller et punir. In my re-reading of the relevant chapters of Fou-
cault’s book I argue that the gaze does not occupy a central role in the techniques of discipline 
and power that Foucault describes. Quite to the contrary, Foucault analyses virtualization and 
automatization procedures that – after cutting off of the King’s head – invert and eliminate the 
sovereignty of the gaze as well: they also rip out the sovereign’s eye. Surveiller et punir thus 
should be read as a book about a certain eyelessness of the modern political. Where truly modern 
power is assumed to be, there is nothing to be seen. This also means that panopticism does not 
provide a master key to understand digital technologies of power. 
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“L’efficace du pouvoir, sa force contraignante sont, en quelque sorte, passées de l’autre côté – 
du côté de sa surface d’application. Celui qui est soumis à un champ de visibilité, et qui le sait, 
reprend à son compte les contraintes du pouvoir; il les fait jouer spontanément sur lui-même; il 
inscrit en soi le rapport de pouvoir dans lequel il joue simultanément les deux rôles; il devient le 
principe de son propre assujettissement.” 
 
„Die Wirksamkeit von Macht und ihre zwingende Kraft gehen in gewisser Weise auf die andere 
Seite über – die Seite der Oberfläche, auf welche sie sich anwendet. Derjenige, welcher einem 
Sichtfeld ausgesetzt ist und dies weiß, übernimmt die Zwangsmittel der Macht und spielt sie 
gegen sich selber aus; er schreibt das Machtverhältnis in sich ein, in welchem er gleichzeitig beide 
Rollen spielt; er wird zum Prinzip seiner eigenen Unterwerfung.“ 
 
„The efficiency of power, its constraining force have, in a sense, passed over to the other side – 
to the side of its surface of application. He who is subjected to a field of visibility, and who knows 
it, assumes responsibility for the constraints of power; he makes them play spontaneously upon 
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himself; he inscribes in himself the power relation in which he simultaneously plays both roles: he 
becomes the principle of his own subjection.”1 
 
On at least two occasions in the course of its reception, the Panopticon, the surveillance structure 
designed for full vision, rose to the level of an icon of social and cultural criticism. Immediately 
after the publication of Surveiller et Punir, Foucault’s analysis of the panoptic complex went to the 
heart of the institutional criticism articulated by the antiauthoritarian movement: institutions of 
the welfare state with their programs of humanization of education and prison regime are ex-
posed as forming machines that do not only penetrate deeply into the individual; it is precisely 
these institutions that establish the individual’s modern—which also means today’s—manner of 
being. The kind face of a society that has (almost) no corporal punishment, but instead new spac-
es free to be shaped by civil actors, corresponds to the grimace of meticulous psychotechnical or-
dering. The will to form the person transforms even the youngest and the most stupid person 
from within, not to speak of the criminal. In this context, the Panopticon represents a kind of be-
ginning inasmuch as from 1900 on, psychoanalysis, occupational psychology, sport psychology, 
brain surgery, psychopharmaceuticals and other pseudo-humane optimizing measures follow—
and in the seventies, the readers are quite aware of this.2 
At the end of the nineteen-nineties, the Panopticon as analysed by Foucault was read as a 
symbol for the digital era. Data are collected in all everyday domains of life, including those 
where behaviour is the critical factor, but also in those that are only related to consumption (lei-
sure and entertainment activities), and this collection seems to be something like a “panoptic” 
practice, though it is one that largely abstains from the architecture of detention. Quite the contra-
ry, it now penetrates public space as a whole. Video surveillance and automatic recognition of 
faces and movement are especially prominent in this regard; but beyond that, the inescapable 
awareness that user traces on the net, digital payment transactions, and digital communications 
are tracked is reminiscent of Bentham’s transparency machinery. Furthermore, the voluntary self-
presentation of private people who unabashedly chat on the net or pose for cameras looks 
strangely compulsive. Confronted with numerous new technologies and phenomena, a move-
ment critical not of the prison system, but of data policy, draws on Foucault’s analyses. Bentham’s 
panopticism seems to amount to an early form of comprehensive individualized monitoring—or 
                                                 
1 Michel Foucault: Surveiller et punir. Naissance de la prison. Paris: Gallimard 1975, p. 204; German: Überwachen und 
Strafen. Die Geburt des Gefängnisses, trans. by Walter Seitter [translation slightly modified; more on this below, 
pgg]. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp 1976, S. 260; English: Discipline and Punish. The Birth of the Prison, trans. by 
Alan Sheridan. London: Allen Lane, 1977, pp. 202 f. [My italics in all versions, pgg]. 
2 Today, the will to form the person already begins before birth with biomedical measures to make the best of 
each individual; it seems to have become the will to complete renewal. The archaic option of killing the incura-
ble, later the “extermination” of worthless life, is now irrelevant. Genetic preselection and prenatal “therapy” 
make anxiety about how to come to terms with impaired individuals superfluous (at least conceptually) by 
means of intervention before they even come to be. 




at least it represents a comparable case that can be used to reveal characteristics of today’s surveil-
lance, which is enhanced by digital technology. 
However, I will attempt to show that both waves of the reception misread Foucault’s anal-
yses of early modern architecture for reformed institutions—as a “laboratory”,3 as “political tech-
nology”4 and as a “diagram of a mechanism of power reduced to its ideal form”5—and for this 
reason have a foreshortened understanding of the Panopticon. On the one hand, the panopticism 
chapter was read lopsidedly in terms of a theory of the subject,6 and on the other hand it was vis-
ualistically twisted, with a bias towards making visible.7 It was not a rare thing for both to be 
done at once. One way or the other, the idea of an internalization of the guard’s look, presumably 
caused by panoptic pressure, was established; this look took effect so to speak from within, as 
powerful and constitutive of the subject.8 
By way of an interpretation of this kind,9 one point of Foucault’s analysis is missed, one 
that is both historically and systematically decisive. The Panopticon is indeed a perfidious tech-
nique to control the gaze. But it is also an arrangement to promote the devaluation of the gaze 
                                                 
3 Cf. SP 206/Germ. 263/Engl. 204. 
4 Cf. SP 207/Germ. 264/Engl. 205. 
5 Ibid. 
6 For instance, by describing its operating principle as “sublimation”, e.g. Robert Castel: “From dangerousness to 
risk”, in: Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon, Peter Miller (Eds.): The Foucault Effect. Studies in Governmentality. Chi-
cago: University of Chicago Press 1991, p. 281-298, p. 288 (“sublimated form of the observing gaze”). — As is 
well known, Foucault distinguished the individual (and individuality in general) from the subject as a possible 
result of specific historical processes (for example techniques of examination or self-examination). It is in this 
sense that I use the concepts. 
7 We can then read, for example, that according to Foucault “a light of violence“ was the legacy of Enlighten-
ment, “a light, that involves the subject not only in social relations organised for increasing subjection but also in 
the normalization of self-regulatory processes—the forever vigilant inner eye of ‘conscience’.” Cf. David Michael 
Levin: Keeping Foucault and Derrida in Sight: Panopticism and the Politics of Subversion. In: David Michael 
Levin (Ed.): Sites of Vision. The Discursive Construction of Sight in the History of Philosophy. Cambridge: MIT Press 
1997, pp. 397-465, here p. 442. 
8 In the 1990s and to the present day, visualism was furthered by Deleuze’s early proposal that power should be 
interpreted as force, the body as visibility and the subject as a “fold” of the one into the other creating an interi-
or; cf. Gilles Deleuze: Foucault. Paris: Minuit 1986. 
9 As is typical of anthropological and psychologistic bias, this is not particularly based on argumentation. Rather, 
many Foucault interpretations simply insinuate that the “visual surveillance adduced by Bentham” is general-
ized by Foucault (in contrast to Bentham) to a “ubiquitous form of modern exercise of power”; sooner or later, 
the principle of operation of panopticism transforms inspection into introspection so that the “mechanism of 
visual analysis” founds a “voluntary submission” that functions as a “parody of the modern idea of autonomy”; 
cf. Peter Niesen: “Die Macht der Publizität” [The power of publicity], in: Ralf Krause, Marc Rölli (eds.): Macht. 
Begriff und Wirkung in der politischen Philosophie der Gegenwart [Power. Concept and effect in present-day 
political philosophy]. Bielefeld: transcript, 2008, pp. 221-244, here p. 225 (the excerpt preceding my article is 
quoted in the passage in question). 
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because it brings about a kind of reversal, an evacuation, an inversion of the eye—yet neither in a 
quasi focusing manner (perhaps individualizing, socializing, and to this end with an ‘inward’ 
penetrating power) nor in a quasi all-seeing manner, as an omnipotent gaze spread ‘all-round’. 
The mode of operation and the effect of panopticism is rather a kind of non-sightedness, a sus-
pension and expiry of the gaze and thus also of the power of the eye. And this does not happen in 
favour of a generalized eye that seemingly remains present, but rather in favour of disciplining 
forms that completely withdraw from sight. The Panopticon would then be a transitional phe-
nomenon. It marks the threshold to a non-visual, anocular and faceless operation of power. 
I speak sweepingly of an “inversion” of the eye—and of the visual function in general—as 
the genuine point of the panoptic scenario; I do so to contest the idea of the internalization of the 
other’s gaze, to enhance awareness for the non-visual as an element of the effective panoptic axes 
(subduing the individual body, guarding the guards, partitioning and individualizing) and to 
amend the common idea of the contribution of the panopticism chapter in Surveiller et punir to 
Foucault’s diagnosis of the beginning of modernity: it is not so much that the guard’s eye finds its 
way into the prisoner, rather it is inverted to a functional minimum. Panopticism theses that are 
fixated on the eye would accordingly have to be turned inside out. And the modern era that be-
gins around 1800 and develops throughout the nineteenth century10 can, in keeping with Fou-
cault, be called everything, but never an era of the eye. 
Let me briefly reconstruct (1) Foucault’s arguments in my way: the chapter on the moyens 
du bon dressement, the “means of correct training” directly preceding the panopticism chapter, 
plays the decisive part, not Bentham.11 I demonstrate (2) that the regime of the panoptic gaze does 
not really aim at the creation of inwardness. Furthermore, I would like to identify (3) what Fou-
cault does not say with regard to the role of the eye in the context of disciplining and in the pan-
optic diagram. This concerns the complexes of subjectification and self-government; both of 
which are far from having anything to do with forced self-visualization. Rather, with respect to 
subjectification, other power mechanisms play the decisive part: the technology of the examen—
that is, arrangements of examinations, probation, tests12—as well as the broad subject of sexuali-
                                                 
10 It is well known that, according to Foucault, not only the era of the human sciences, but also the modern era in 
general begins with the nineteenth century. This is in accordance with current European historical scholarship, 
which views the years around 1800 as a transitional period (“Sattelzeit”) or as a “threshold” between the epochs. 
When I speak of the modern era, I adhere to this usage; moreover, I mean (as did Foucault) that what began after 
the period of panoptic prison architecture—medicalization, psychiatrization and eugenic attempts to obliterate 
crime—are still not a thing of the past. 
11 It was interesting, particularly for political theory, to read Foucault’s analyses as applicable to Bentham’s so-
cial thought as a whole. Nonetheless, Bentham’s vision (which Foucault only presents in the book as a comple-
ment) should not be overestimated with respect to its significance for the phenomenon of institutional buildings 
designed with a view to seeing and being seen. Panoptic architecture existed apart from elaborate political theo-
ry. Above all, it manifests an engineering knowledge that adheres to certain maxims of optimization. 
12 On the topic of the examination in connection with Foucault, see Andreas Gelhard’s and Andreas Kaminski’s 
studies: Andreas Gelhard: “Das Dispositiv der Eignung: Elemente einer Geschichte der Prüfungstechniken” 
 




zation, an intensification of relations to self and other; and in the context of these relations, the 
eye, if it plays a part at all, plays a completely different one than in panoptic institutions. As far as 
subjectification is concerned, Surveiller et punir (and in general the tenets on discipline) can only 
be read fruitfully in connection with La volonté de savoir. Accordingly, the two analyses should not 
be overburdened, each for itself, but rather related to each other with regard to the question of the 
subject. 
Finally, it seems important to me (4) that panopticism not be sweepingly declared to be the 
signature of the times for the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. Rather, I propose that it be in-
terpreted as a tile of a historical mosaic in terms of a transitional figure—in the transition to post-
panoptic phenomena of power such as eugenics or Freud’s talking-cure. The reformed institu-
tions built on a panoptic design display a regime of the gaze that in part is pre-modern; it teaches 
us indirectly something about the forms of observation and registration that shortly thereafter in 
fact took effect ‘spacelessly’ without a tower representing eyes, blind windows or a camera physi-
cally in sight to which they could be attributed. In my interpretation, we learn from Foucault’s 
analysis of the Panopticon not so much something about subjectification as about the power of 
the permanence of technical systems, and about forms of automation of what used to be physical 
observation, an automation that, though simple, undermines the perception of being perceived. 
Precisely at this point, the leap into the present seems to me possible: It is not with a view to anx-
ious reflection on the person under “surveillance” in front of the camera that Foucault’s text is 
helpful. Rather, it seems to foreshadow a post-panoptic analysis of power, for example an analy-
sis of the present day’s epoch-making, completely decentralized collection of data that, strangely 
enough, we blindly tolerate and just as blindly carry out. I shall only suggest this briefly in sum-
mary, again advocating that the panopticism chapter should not be read as a text on the presence 
of the eye, but rather on a metamorphosis of technology that not only makes the observer super-
fluous in the control of human beings, but even the gaze itself. 
 
  
                                                                                                                                                                       
[The dispositive of aptitude: elements of a history of examination techniques]. In: Zeitschrift für Medien- und 
Kulturforschung, Nr. 1 (2014), pp. 43-60; 2014; id. “Entgrenzung der Psychotechnik: Der neue Geist des 
Kapitalismus und das Problem der Prüfungstechniken“ [Dislimitation of psychotechnique: the new spirit of 
capitalism and the problem of examination techniques], in: Andreas Kaminski and Andreas Gelhard (eds.): Zur 
Philosophie informeller Technisierung [On the philosophy of informal technization]. Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 
Darmstadt, pp. 185-203, and Andreas Kaminski: “Maßstäbe der Macht. Psychologische Prüfungen als Techniken 
des Selbst“ [Measures of power. Psychological examinations as techniques of the self]. In: id. and Andreas 
Gelhard (eds.): Zur Philosophie der informellen Technisierung. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft 2014, 
pp.171-184. 
Foucault Studies, No. 23, pp. 46-62 
 51 
1. 
In Foucault’s genealogy of the prison system, the period of discipline with its typical partitioning 
detention institution is not the end point. Surveiller et punir analyses disciplinary betterment as a 
transformation that was followed on the way into the modern era by more transformations—
above all the socio-political and criminological paradigm of delinquency, which initiated the era 
of a systematic pathologization of the criminal, the attribution of somatic (perhaps “genetic”) rea-
sons for incorrigibility and, when deemed necessary, invasive therapeutic scenarios. Beyond 
training and detention, medicalized measures for prevention herald the era of punishment in a 
truly modern sense.13 
First of all discipline: Foucault portrays it as an innovation in a political structure in which 
up until then the visibility of the ruler was the main point. In the classical age, the exercise of 
power took place demonstratively: the “eye” made hierarchy evident inasmuch as the sovereign 
displayed himself and his symbols as magnificent and threatening. The subjects could “see” both 
the splendour and the force of the order. Discipline reverses the direction of view, so to speak, 
and at the same time the vectors are distributed and multiplied. This, too, is a regime of the gaze, 
but one that uses the gaze as a means of coercion, one that arranges a play of looking, an “obscure 
art of light and the visible”14 so that it leads to activation and serviceable formation, that is, to the 
“training” (dressement) of the subject. Being seen thus takes on the meaning of registration. It be-
comes the key to minute control and self-discipline, requiring practice from the individual to look 
at himself or to give a report (rapport) on himself. As Foucault demonstrates, the establishment of 
a standardized external body posture plays an important part; but in addition, an analogous ef-
fect on the level of the training of the person is also desired. Discipline thus corresponds to the 
educational expectation that, by way of training behaviour, the disciplined individual will au-
thentically adopt what he or she is supposed to learn. 
The gaze of policey actors engaged in instruction and betterment is mistrustful. It is also 
“hierarchical” again, as we can read at several points in Surveiller et punir,15 and above all it is 
anonymous, that is, though it comes from above, at the same time it comes in a new, diffuse way 
from somewhere or other. Force is immediately involved: tools and instruments of the exercise of 
force opening the gaze—with a mode of operation that presupposes visibility, visual and cogni-
tive transparency—are often one and the same in disciplinary arrangements. Surveiller et punir 
demonstrates this for the factory, the school, the military and for prisons. Just as the medical gaze 
opens the patient’s living body, discipline penetrates into the body and its abilities in a quasi-
                                                 
13 Foucault studies these paths of pathologization of eighteenth century forensic medicine in a lecture that he 
held in 1974–75, that is, before the publication of Surveiller et punir, dating the decisive stages for France in the 
middle of the nineteenth century; cf. Michel Foucault: Les Anormaux. Cours au Collège de France, 1974-1975. Paris: 
Seuil/Gallimard 1999. 
14 Cf. SP 173/Germ. 221/Engl. 171; and on the spotlight as an analogy for the field of vision of the disciplinary 
gaze also SP 189/Germ. 241/Engl. 187. 
15 Cf. e.g. SP 173/Germ. 220f./Engl. 171. 




exploratory manner, at first as mere training, and later increasingly becoming interested in the 
inner attitude. Foucault compares the disciplinary site with a photographic dark room,16 and the 
new architectural arrangements of the time with a “therapeutic operator”17 as well as with a mi-
croscope18 because walls are put in place in order to separate and to create transparency. Architec-
ture creates sections in which the eye (in Bentham’s utopia even more: the eyes of as many visi-
tors to the institution as possible) can and is intended to look into a jumbled picture of the social 
world. Mechanistic and vitalist paradigms are in close connection. Society as a whole becomes a 
commonwealth of cells.19 
What Foucault emphasizes is: Disciplinary power is itself invisible power. There is a nega-
tive reason for this in the reversal of the direction of illumination: the subjects are seen and ex-
posed instead of displaying the ruler and his entourage. But above all, in a positive sense the 
switch from techniques of ruling that function symbolically to techniques that function causally 
takes effect. Discipline is directed towards the small things, and attempts to gain as complete con-
trol as possible not by representation, but physically. It perfects its core operations—partitioning, 
surveillance, regenerative interventions—both qualitatively and over as long a period as possible 
in order to promote effectiveness: it connects with fine, functional, even “organic” (not to speak of 
“vital”) criteria, and it attempts to initiate its measures as early as possible to maintain them per-
manently. Since the temporal aspect of disciplinary work—ensuring permanent visibility of the 
individuals to be disciplined and providing for their permanent observation—involves an enor-
mous effort, the patterns of discipline are in great measure of an economic nature; we shall return 
to this point. 
A surveillance that is not merely “hierarchized” (hiérachisée), but also “continuous” and 
“functional” (continue et fonctionelle) is, according to Foucault, “one of the great technical ‘inven-
tions’ of the eighteenth century”; this is precisely what characterizes the abstract system behind 
the panoptic form: a “network” (réseau) of mutually supporting effects of power, “supervisors, 
perpetually supervised”,20 a “machinery” (machinerie) or an “apparatus” (appareil) that not only 
from the ‘top’, but also inwardly “produces ‘power’ and distributes individuals in this permanent 
                                                 
16 Cf. SP 174/Germ. 222/Engl. 172. 
17 Cf. SP 175/Germ. 223/Engl. 172. 
18 Cf. SP 175/Germ. 224/Engl. 173. 
19 This well-known expression is a quotation from the physician Virchow, who, in a manner typical of his time, 
projected the mixture of social division of labour (society) and legal hierarchy (the state) into organic “life”. 
“What is the organism? A society of living cells, a small state, well equipped, with all the furnishings of senior 
and junior officials, servants and masters, large and small.” Cf. Rudolf Virchow: “Atome und Individuen” 
[Atoms and Individuals] (1859). In: Vier Reden über Leben und Kranksein [Four lectures on life and being ill]. 
Berlin: Georg Reimer 1862, pp. 35-76, here p. 55; of course, in Surveiller et punir, medicine is only touched in pass-
ing. 
20 Cf. SP 179/Germ. 228/Engl. 176. 
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and continuous field”.21 This analogy of a vector network or a forcefield is probably implicit when 
in Surveiller et punir Foucault speaks of the “physical” character of disciplinary power or of the 
“‘physics’ of power”22 and of the panoptic formation of individual and social bodies as a “new 
physics of power”.23 
“Unavoidable visibility of the subjects”,24 the inevitability of being described and describ-
ing—the point I want to make is this: the topic here is indeed the physical in a physical sense, it is 
not psychology. If the pragmatics of training involves continuous monitoring, the specific aspect 
of the panoptic machinery consists not so much in the visual orientation as such or in a deepening 
of the visual element in general, but rather in the operative surplus of securing (or re-adjusting) 
behavioural patterns along set values and in the automatization that it brings about: On the one 
hand, permanence is produced (continuousness in every point: partitioning, seeing, being seen, 
and the certainty that this is the case); on the other hand the corset of architecturally controlled 
axes of visibility functions such that it distributes and orders fields of vision and places all the 
users of the building in the same form of asymmetry. Hierarchy is there, but it is no longer the 
origin that counts, but only its effect. For its part, this effect reproduces itself purely technically in 
the literal sense of the word, that is, without any personal contribution, by means of the impene-
trable intermediation of walls and openings, as the presence of an architecture that controls and 
even substitutes axes of vision. “The Panopticon is a marvellous machine which, whatever use 
one may wish to put it to, produces homogeneous effects of power”,25 Foucault writes. 
Thus, the question arises as to how a “machine” that in such a manner orders the effects of 
power with the goal of disciplining in fact works. 
 
2. 
“L’efficace du pouvoir, sa force contraignante sont, en quelque sorte, passées de l’autre côté – du 
côté de sa surface d’application.”26 The German translator, Walter Seitter, translates this statement, 
which comes after the passage quoted above on the Panopticon as a marvellous machine, as fol-
lows: The effectiveness, the constraining force of power passes “over to its target” (auf ihre 
                                                 
21 Cf. SP 179/Germ. 229/Engl. 176–7. 
22 Cf. SP 179/Germ. 229/Engl. 177. 
23 Cf. SP 210/Germ. 267/Engl. 208; the fact that this revolves on the opposition of two physics, namely one cen-
tred on the body of the sovereign, thus “corporal”, and another that is “physical”, a physics of the numerous 
forces that traverse space in (potentially changing) distributed form, becomes particularly clear in this passage 
on Bentham’s panopticism. Cf. the statement in SP 179/Germ. 229/Engl. 177 that discipline is “all the less ‘cor-
poral’ in that it is more subtly ‘physical’” [in French, the passage reads: “Pouvoir qui est en apparance d’autant 
moins ‘corporel’ qu’il est plus savement ‘physique’.”] 
24 Cf. SP 191/Germ. 243/Engl. 189: “visibilité inévitable des sujets”—the German translation uses quotation marks 
here (“unerbittliche Sichtbarkeit der ‘Subjekte’”), in order to emphasize the ambiguity that ‘subject’ need not 
mean an epistemological ego-position, it can also designate a role: “subordinate person”. 
25 SP 204/Germ. 260/Engl. 202 (my italics, pgg). 
26 SP 204 (my italics, pgg). 




Zielscheibe). “[D]u côté de sa surface d’application”—it would be better to render this more literally: 
Power passes over to the surface on which it then takes effect: “to the side of its surface of appli-
cation”, as Alan Sheridan quite precisely translates. In the process, power becomes non-bodily, “it 
tends to the non-corporal” (il tend à l’incorporel), writes Foucault.27 
The point is still effectiveness in or on bodies; the panoptic effect is described as the effect 
of a compelling force. Nonetheless, a systematically displaced effect comes into operation: Under 
the control of the building, the separate bodies of the prisoner, the guard, the visitor are all inte-
grated into the machinery, and no one has to do anything to bring this about. The creation of de-
fined, even of merely possible lines of sight spares the physical confrontation or collision. 
According to the text, “the major effect” of the Panopticon is that “the inmates should be 
caught up in a power situation of which they are themselves the bearers”;28 the architectural ap-
paratus ensures an “automatic functioning”29 of power. Precisely this was different in the times 
when a guard enforced the hierarchy ‘by hand’ so to speak. Hence Foucault repeatedly uses the 
metaphor of automatizing in connection with the panoptic disciplinary arrangement; beyond 
that, he also speaks of a disindividualization of power and of the fact that under the aspect of 
power only bodies (and no longer persons) count.30 
We readers are familiar with the following passage, which, however, suggests that there is 
more that occurs: 
 
He who is subjected to a field of visibility (champ de visibilité), and who knows it, assumes responsibility 
for the constraints of power; he makes them play spontaneously upon himself; he inscribes in himself the 
power relation in which he simultaneously plays both roles; he becomes the principle of his own 
subjection (assujettissement). By this very fact, the external power may throw off its physical weight (ses 
pesanteurs physiques)... .31 
 
The transition from the physical to another kind of physics—does inwardness take effect here 
beyond the mere knowledge of being seen? At any rate, physically onerous force is replaced by 
another type of force—by a self-constraint, a self-observation, from the point of view of what the 
guardian’s gaze sees. 
In the German translation, however, the passage in question reads differently and is ren-
dered in clear psychologizing terms. The person being observed, 
 
                                                 
27 SP 204/Germ. 260/Engl. 203. 
28 SP 203/Germ. 258/Engl. 201. 
29 Cf. SP 202/ Germ. 258/Engl. 201. 
30 Cf. SP 203/Germ. 259/Engl. 202: “It is an important mechanism, for it automatizes and disindividualizes 
power.” 
31 SP 204/Germ. 260/Engl. 202f. 
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[h]e who is subject to visibility, and who knows it, adopts the constraints of power; he pits them against 
himself; he internalizes the power relation in which he simultaneously plays both roles; he becomes the 
principle of his own subjection.32 
 
It seems to me that this wording — “internalisieren” (internalize) for “inscrire en soi”—together 
with the idea that it suggests a double role that is not only firmly inscribed, but emphatically in-
ternalized, has promoted the interpretation that the panoptic operation aims at and brings about 
subjectification in a sense that is ‘already’ modern. It is not only German-speaking readers of Sur-
veiller et punir who interpret this key passage in terms of a subject cliché that belongs to ego psy-
chology of the twentieth century. This “internalized” gaze of the guard is said to turn the person 
observed into an ego-subject—perhaps in a manner reminiscent of a Hegelian master and slave 
scene, perhaps because we think of Freud’s super-ego, of Sartre or of Foucault’s catchword “tech-
niques of subjectification” (which, however, referred to ancient ethics). 
I caution against this interpretation, not only because there is no mention of becoming a 
subject in the panopticism chapter—apart from the enthralling word “assujettissement”, which, 
as we know, means making subject in the sense of the counterpart to domination, the assignment 
of a lesser role; the word thus alludes to the subiectum in the very simple sense of the word and by 
no means to modern subjectivity with its reflective inwardness. The more important reason, how-
ever, is that the power relationship is “inscribed” into the individual in the mode of “knowing 
that” (simply due to the architectural disposition) and that it cannot concern any other knowledge 
than knowledge of the individual’s own body—inasmuch as the individual expects that this body 
can be seen and knows prospectively how it can be seen at any moment. Movements of the body, 
forbidden gestures, facial expression, restlessness: all of this is subject to a kind of observation 
that requires permanent self-control on the part of the person under observation. However, the 
full extent is that the self-awareness required by the regime applies to the visible surfaces, that is, 
one’s own exterior. In this case, discipline means: in the grasp of the panoptic system, in which 
the physical gaze is replaced by the virtuality of a permanent gaze, individuals sooner or later 
routinely anticipate the bodily behaviour that they have to display. 
Constraint is thus transformed into self-constraint and fixed. The genuinely novel point 
about the inner doubling, however, is the permanence created by the virtualization of the observ-
er’s gaze and the economic savings inasmuch as the external eye, chains and the like become dis-
pensable. Subjectification, however, takes place here no more and no less than when an automatic 
speed camera forces us to observe a prescribed speed limit. The novel point is not the disciplining 
effect of being seen, but rather that the alterity of the other’s gaze can be replaced such that ma-
chinery displaces all possible perception of the observation being interrupted (there was an eye, 
now there is no eye there). Instead, the eye becomes a spectre. Accordingly, it is not the case that 
another’s gaze is inscribed in the person subject to observation as their ‘own’, quite the opposite: 
                                                 
32 Cf. Germ. 260. 




the other’s gaze was previously virtualized. And precisely this non-gaze, about which we know 
without seeing it, becomes chiasmatically anchored—in the form of a secondary gaze that com-
pels the person under observation to conscious, bodily self-control without any need to exert 
physical compulsion or the force of the genuine eye. 
Foucault never mentions any identification processes, say that the person under observa-
tion identifies to any great extent with the guard (who has just disappeared) or with the image 
that he leaves (which is only for the virtual eye). That is not what Foucault is aiming at because 
that is not the point at all. Panopticism does not presuppose internalization and identification 
with the guard’s eye, but rather a new form of absence of this eye. What it establishes is an eyeless 
technique of control and in this sense precisely an anocular machinery: based simply on the 
knowledge of the persistence of the possible axes of vision, it turns the visible outside of the indi-
vidual’s own body into the “physical” prison of behaviour. Classical force is superfluous inas-
much as it is removed from its “physical” sources (chains, eyes) and its effects not merely re-
tained, but perpetuated and, in the ideal case, even augmented 
 
3. 
There are numerous systematic reasons within the text for a rejection of a visualistic interpreta-
tion of panopticism or one centred on subjectification. 
On the one hand, Foucault separates his analysis of the “examination” from the panopti-
cism chapter in precisely this respect. Whereas the panoptic regime is one of automatized train-
ing—consisting of many “small theatres”,33 as the text puts it, that is, a behavioural omniscope 
that individualizes and perfects a form of oppositionless and eyeless, performance-orientated self-
control of the body known to be visible, thus actually producing actors. In contrast, Surveiller et 
punir depicts the examination as the genuine instrument of subjectificating in the disciplinary era. 
Here we do not see performers but rather testees. For techniques of examination, the central point 
is neither a visible eye nor, so to speak, an inverted eye, a permanent being seen in the form of 
knowledge of the gaze. Rather, from the very beginning we are in a world in which power oper-
ates unilaterally, itself invisible, but invasive. The dominant metaphor is now that of the spotlight 
directed at the individual because they have to produce something on their own and perform in 
their own name, individually. The aspect of the examination does not consist simply in being 
seen, but rather—presupposing “the fact of being constantly seen, of being able always to be 
seen”34 as its mode—it consists of an objectifying “ceremony”35 that is performed, measuring and 
documenting individuality and then restoring it as a kind of success or gain on the level of latent 
essential potentials or capacities (that is, transgressing mere visible attributes or a bare behaviour-
                                                 
33 Cf. SP 202/Germ. 257/Engl. 200: “They … [i.e. the cells, pgg] are like so many small theatres, in which each 
actor is alone, perfectly individualized and constantly visible.” 
34 Cf. SP 189/Germ. 241/Engl. 187. 
35 SP 190/Germ. 241/Engl. 187. 
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al scheme). Backed by sanctions and also reinforced by positive stimuli, examination procedures 
enable a sense of achievement: they create options and success thresholds for subjectivity in a 
manner that disrupts any theatre metaphor. 
Whereas the panoptic space exacts the permanent demonstration of a behaviour, the exam-
ination is a technology that produces expressive performances that can be attributed to the indi-
vidual together with a corresponding interior closely bound to the examination result—a psyche 
for psychologies. Thus, the examination (and not panopticism) is the context within which Fou-
cault for the first time explicitly characterizes power as productive: “Power produces; it produces 
reality” (il produit du réel);36 it also produces the individual, in particular, the “true” individual. 
The fact that techniques of examination that turn the individual into a “case” do not yet 
completely foresee the modern formation of something like subjectivity for the first time in the 
nineteenth century is a point that Foucault vigorously demonstrates in La volonté du savoir—the 
book in which the history of the examination is integrated into the history of “sexualized” desire. 
In the second half of the nineteenth century, compulsions to confess developed from a novel, bio-
logical–psychological inwardness of the drives, and produced not only these drives, but also the 
subjectivity corresponding to them, a subjectivity that is precarious in a typically modern way. 
The history of the examination thus merges seamlessly into a history of criminalization and of 
medicalization, and also into a history of the naturalization of inheritance, of the species and of 
heterosexual binary sexuality. Moreover, it is not by any means a visualism that dominates mod-
ern techniques of selfhood. The subject of desire is no longer a subject that merely obeys an eye 
directed at surfaces from a distance, whether it is an eye visible the person under observation or 
not. Now, the concealed interior behind all outer bodily surfaces does indeed become a highly 
charged topic. Drives cannot be seen, and they cannot be controlled by superficial means, by way 
of corrections to what is shown. ‘External’ role competence is mere appearance and must yield to 
self-scrutiny. Therapeutic suspicion declines visuality, it rejects mere “theatre”. Genuine expres-
sion therefore requires not the objectified individual as a body in a cage, but rather efforts to ex-
plore bodies and behavioural patterns in equal measure. Partitioning, observation, documenta-
tion are not sufficient. At best, they accompany experiments in opening up a “subjective” depth, 
the essence of which ultimately remains concealed to both the senses and to language. The tools 
of the specialist in psychosomatics or psychotechnique can be a metaphor for these experiments, 
but not, however, the guard’s gaze. 
According to the final sections of Surveiller et punir, “delinquency” is the modern response 
to the question of criminality in the full sense of modern; it, too, leaves visualism behind. Nothing 
of what in its complex way ineradicably drives entire social groups from within to deviant behav-
iour, whether environmentally conditioned or inherited, can be detected externally “on” the bod-
ies, on the behavioural surface as a “target” or main “surface of application” for power. Rather, 
like sexuality delinquency it is a latency phenomenon, inaccessible to the supervising gaze. The 
                                                 
36 Cf. SP 196/Germ. 250/Engl. 194. 




limitation of behaviour that is merely affected, say an imitated conformity that is induced by pan-
optic means, is no longer sufficient for the reformative criminal law of the period around 1900. 
Instead of “deeds” and “violations of law”, “character” (or “mind”) and “life” (or genetic disposi-
tion) count in the penal system.37 But no eye, not even an anonymous, an adopted or an inverted 
eye, can ever look into desire, genetic disposition, libido, into “being”. 
Modern disciplining procedures disengage from visual reminiscences at the points where 
they have mutated to technologies of inwardness and depth. They become “humane” in a new 
sense, not merely that they are physically less violent, but rather in the sense that the interven-
tions are mimetic–interpretative and performed only in the “invisible” realm. It could be said that 
the eye closes when the personalities of offenders are inferred from mounds of court records, the 
degeneration of cells is traced or dreams analysed. At best, the observer is needed between the 
phases of intervention because as a matter of course individualization imperatives apply and no 
one is allowed to escape, even from the most modern facilities for subjectification. Apart from 
this, panopticism has done its part and is acquitted of its duties wherever bio-, psycho- or socio-
political subjectification techniques take effect—apart, perhaps, from Bentham’s model of democ-
racy in which the need for transparency in modern publics is still ideologically mirrored. 
 
4. 
There still remains the question of the timeliness of Foucault’s analysis of panopticism. That sur-
veillance is intended to ‘make visible’ is an obvious assumption and is also adopted by the criti-
cism of surveillance focused on new digital techniques.38 There are indeed many voices in surveil-
lance studies that emphasize, for example, the primacy of the ordering function of the Panopti-
con.39 Nonetheless, the fervour of research into images and visibility was sparked by the domi-
                                                 
37 What Foucault ironically calls the “Declaration of Carceral Independence” (cf. SP 250/Germ. 317/Engl. 247) 
marks the withdrawal of the penal system as an autonomous project of betterment from the verdict and the 
court’s appraisal of the deed. Accordingly, modern penal systems no longer enforce a court verdict (conceived 
as a reaction), but rather themselves assess, on the basis of the results of the phase of imprisonment, how to deal 
with the offender in the future. If the penal system has an ideal at all, it is the ideal of producing individuals 
who become different. This corresponds to forms that in the twentieth century take leave of the time limits of 
prison penalties, for example detention in forensic psychiatric institutions, called “Maßregelvollzug” (discipli-
nary detention) in Germany. The possibility of release is then reviewed regularly (on the basis of expert opin-
ions). But the end of detention is no longer scheduled. 
38 Cf. a programmatic declaration in the journal Surveillance and Society: “Surveillance tries to make visible the 
identities or the behaviours of people of interest to the agency in question,” David Lyon: “Editorial. 
Understanding visibility, mobility and the phonetic fix”, in: Surveillance & Society 1 (2002), 1-7, 
http://www.surveillance-and-society.org/articles1/editorial.pdf [1.3.2016]. 
39 Cf. Bart Simon: “The Return of Panopticism”, in: Surveillance & Society 3 (2005), 1-20, http://www.surveillance-
and-society.org/articles3(1)/return.pdf [1.3.2016], here: 4, who, however, then refers the processes of “panoptic 
sorting” quite unclearly to questions of “self” and “subjectification” (of the prison inmates, or more generally of 
the monitored individuals). 
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nant theme of the circular institution with the cells that can be seen from all perspectives. The 
fiendishness of a surveillance state is projected into the lens of the digital camera, and it works 
completely without a surveillance tower and prison walls;40 or a super-ego function of the internet 
as a digital subjectification machine is painted on the wall, and the modern subject—especially 
the young—submit to this machine by way of an inconceivable auto-socio-eroticism and pleasure 
in being observed. From the reality show on television through the video diary to the selfie, the 
Panopticon seems to be everywhere. 
My thesis, by contrast, is as follows: The panopticism analysed in Surveiller et punir is an 
early ideal—with respect to its nature as an individualizing force and with respect to the nexus of 
being seen and seeing oneself. Even the withdrawal of the observing eye into the multi-
directionality of an invisible, enduring gaze transformed into the mere knowledge of the possibil-
ity of being seen must not mean that the paradigm of the theatre is left behind. Viewed historical-
ly, panopticism remains a phenomenon of transition. At all points in which the eye is dominant in 
its physical function aiming at the monitoring of external behaviour, the panoptic arrangement 
remains premodern, i.e. a part of the legacy of the era of the king’s representative with visible and 
visually demanding presence, including the acquired doubling thanks to which the prisoner ap-
plies the generalized gaze to himself. He becomes a play-actor, but only that, an actor, not the 
subject of language and desire of a Freudian ego-imago.41 The successors to the examination tech-
niques—techniques, which were also invented in the disciplinary era, techniques completely re-
moved from the eye—will, though, more probably have subjectifying effects (and this means: ef-
fects in the sense of production of interiors, likely unfathomable ones, included in more general 
ego discourses) than do the “little theatres”, which only discipline the behaviour of the body in 
detention. It therefore seems questionable whether the (self-)examination routines, the consump-
tion desire aiming at knowledge, the libidinous charge of virtually available (own) possibilities 
and the scientific experimental practice, which, in a way that is yet to be explored, form the basis 
                                                 
40 Cf. Simon, “Return of Panopticism”, p. 13: “When walls are removed but the supervisory capacities remain we 
enter the conditions of new surveillance.” 
41 The fact that it was and remained a genuine function of the Panopticon to create opportunities for resistance 
(cf. Simon, “Return of Panopticism”, p. 9) is not merely theoretically correct. The possibilities to form people 
simply by exposing them to being seen and, if needed, by imposing negative sanctions are limited; this can be 
recognized by the fact that with regard to successful betterment the prison falls short of institutions in which 
examinations are dominant and go hand in hand with positive subjectification opportunities, for example the 
prospect of education. What Surveiller et punir demonstrates is accordingly the “failure” (échec) of the prison, a 
failure that ultimately remains constant for over a century (cf. SP 275/Germ. 349/Engl. 271): it does not produce 
conformity, but rather increases delinquency. There is a central message of the book that is closely linked to this 
point: where subjectification is not (yet) dominant, resistance is possible; but this message does not receive 
enough discussion, and this lack of discussion is encountered not only in connection with techniques of surveil-
lance. 




of present-day forms of data acquisition, should be called “surveillance” at all.42 The metaphor of 
an “economy” of new and powerful possibilities that Foucault often used seems to fit the record-
ing and distributing of digital data better than the topos of “making visible” or that of rule by the 
gaze. 
As I have shown elsewhere, punishment technologies of a modern type—consider elec-
tronic monitoring devices—are by no means visual or “panoptic” in effect.43 This brings the oper-
ation of mechanization, or, appealing to the German term “technicization” (Technisierung) that 
Foucault called “automatization,” into the focus of our interest; from my point of view, this is the 
genuine panoptic invention. Have we already recognized its historical importance? 
In my opinion, we need to understand the process of inversion better. The Panopticon 
does not improve visual interventions; rather, the highly intricate local work of the eye on which 
the power of the bodily gaze is based is rationalized such that a mere functional unit guarantees 
the possibility of being seen more effectively and efficiently. The Panopticon would be “modern” 
in a challenging manner precisely where it teaches us to domesticate bodies with resources that 
do not comply with a regime of internalized vision, but in an economy of the dispensability of the 
eye. Ultimately, the virtualized gaze promotes the eyelessness of the political. Modern power is 
characterized by the fact that there is never anything to be seen where power is assumed to be. 
It could then be said: Whereas Bentham’s transparent democracy still imagines something 
like a universal “synopsis” and in this point remains premodern, the prison architecture that he 
describes is far more advanced. Beyond the visual pattern, the Panopticon conceives a cybernetics 
of discipline, an exercise of rule and force without a personal opponent, without the guard (who 
is replaced by the building), in general without alterity. This does not promote inwardness as 
much as incorporation and the involuntary disciplining effects of a mimesis of the machine. Even 
today, users who interact with technology see at best their own gaze mirrored in windows, 
                                                 
42 Does the net “observe” at all? Do Google, Facebook “observe”—do even security firms or the NSA observe? It 
may well be preferable to speak of interlocked communication and security markets in which primary products 
for informational value creation circulate. It is in no small measure the net users’ own desire to produce data and 
their own data hunger, perhaps even their passion for play or hunting, that are gratified. Those who today trace 
me on the net are not ‘observers’. They are advertising experts, hordes of sexists, anonymous packs looking for 
victims for the games in which fantasies of omnipotence are tried out. 
43 GPS-linked alarm technologies of the type of digital tags or foot bracelets, for example, do not merely virtual-
ize the guard’s gaze; rather they restrain the individual’s movement pattern by means of a discipline that is so 
discreet as to be privative. They remove the criminal’s body from the space of public perception shared with 
others. The fact that the person concerned knows of invisible technogenic boundaries does not only amount to 
effects reminiscent of drill; rather, the digital arrangement is the equivalent to an artificial bodily handicap, an 
amputation that is performed virtually, remaining hidden to the world of the ‘eye’. Cf. Petra Gehring: ”Eine 
Topo-Technologie der Gefährlichkeit. Digitale Einsperrtechniken und sozialer Raum“ [A topo-technology of 
dangerousness. Digital techniques of detention and social space]. In: Andreas Gelhard, Thomas Alkemeyer, 
Norbert Ricken (Hg.), Techniken der Subjektivierung [Techniques of subjectivation]. München: Fink 2013, pp. 299–
314. 
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screens and other devices. But most often we routinely recognize what has to be done so that eve-
rything is correct. 
“We are much less Greeks than we believe”, writes Foucault in Surveiller et punir with re-
gard to the premodern, somehow visual dream of democracy; moreover, we are “neither in an 
amphitheatre, nor on the stage, but in the panoptic machine”.44 In search of the role of the subju-
gated person (defined by the fact that there is someone who subjugates), we could add, we will 
naturally find no one. Our eyes are mistaken. We are blind to the extent that in search of a ruler 
we see only a void. 
Regardless of cameras, enthusiasm for film and media—the twentieth century, with its be-
ginnings in the nineteenth, proves to be a thoroughly eyeless century, both politically and with 
respect to the constitution of the subject (keyword “examination”). It may well be that the pres-
ence of mass-media pictorial rhetoric is overestimated. Other techniques penetrate deeper, tech-
niques that include knowledge of automatic registration and the permanent possibility of pro-
cessing the traces that I leave. And it may be that the perceived flood of images in the twenty-first 
century does not attest to the triumph of “gazes” that are now media transported and thus omni-
present, but rather to the triumph of mere “knowing about” together with the extinction of the 
idea that the gaze even has an origin as crossing vectors of possible gazes are becoming abstract 
system phenomena. At any rate, panopticism has thus rendered the Napoleonic eye, the sun-eye, 
“useless”.45 
In order to bring the argument to a head, let me conclude with four propositions; the first 
two address Foucault research, the other two are concerned with the discussion of surveillance in 
the wake of Surveiller et punir. 
4.1. An analysis of power in Foucault’s sense with a sensitivity to technology will have to 
reconstruct concrete constellations of surveillance, monitoring, investigation and subjectification 
precisely, separately and specifically to the time period. There is a considerable gap between cir-
cular hospital or prison architecture and the epoch of the moving image as a mass medium to-
gether with automatic motion recording. Panopticism does not provide a master key to under-
stand digital power technologies. 
4.2. The discussion of the disciplinary society still lacks an economic definition of disci-
pline—a definition that takes Foucault’s basic idea of innovative “discipline-normalisation”46 seri-
ously and thus focuses on gains of effectiveness and efficiency, but not on anthropology or psy-
chology. Why should such a definition not be extracted from the comparably simple case of pan-
opticism? 
4.3. Continuous visual surveillance is a disciplining technique, but not a subjectification 
technique. The two must be analytically separated, even if up to the present day the one coexists 
                                                 
44 SP 219/Germ. 279/Engl. 217. 
45 Cf. ibid. 
46 Cf. Foucault, Les Anormaux 48/Germ. 75. 




with the other. The operation of panoptic buildings is rarely found in the modern era in the pure 
form because the modern era is no longer a period of the eye. Consider the intelligence tests of the 
twentieth century, the sensors of ultrasound devices, the visualization equipment for a brain scan, 
being fathomed by questionnaire research, the predictive genetic test—or even spying devices 
such as the military drone: all of these technologies are of the examining intervention type. They 
produce depth, they make something visible that is hidden within the subject and is subjectively 
essential (inner life, intelligence, thought, collective attitudes, genes, the terrorist hideout). At 
best, such techniques quote the eye. But in their core they are post-panoptic. They rely on registra-
tion that is performed out of sight and on data acquisition procedures that run unawares—and 
which thus as a rule do not merely result in behavioural discipline, but rather lead to a fundamen-
tal subjective disquiet.  
4.4. The parents’ and children’s bedrooms of the bourgeoisie, that is, the oedipalized nu-
clear family, and the psychoanalytic couch cannot be interpreted as a “physical” regime of the 
gaze; the same applies to one’s own social network in Facebook and even to NSA surveillance. 
When we speak of people under surveillance today, of databased selves and in general of modern 
subjectivity, we must not be fixated on being seen. Performance-oriented self-commitment, fearful 
self-enjoyment, self-exploration and ego narratives are certainly more significant for an analysis 
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